Negative probabilities and counter-factual reasoning in quantum
  cognition by de Barros, J. Acacio & Oas, Gary
Negative probabilities and counter-factual reasoning
in quantum cognition
J. Acacio de Barros1,∗, and G. Oas2,†
1 LS Program, 1600 Holloway Street, San Francisco State University, San Francisco,
CA 94132
2 SPCS, 220 Panama Street, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4101
E-mail: ∗barros@sfsu.edu, †oas@stanford.edu
Abstract. In this paper we discuss quantum-like decision-making experiments
using negative probabilities. We do so by showing how the two-slit experiment,
in the simplified version of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, can be described by
this formalism. We show that negative probabilities impose constraints to what
types of counter-factual reasoning we can make with respect to (quantum) internal
representations of the decision maker.
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1. Introduction
The use of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics in the social sciences has
experienced a boom in recent years, with whole books solely devoted to certain aspects
of it (see [1, 2, 3] and references therein). Such an endeavour has been dubbed “quantum
interactions,” and it has been the topic of many academic meetings, such as the special
section in Andrei Khrennikov’s foundations of quantum mechanics conference. The goal
of the quantum interaction community is not to search for “true” quantum mechanical
effects, but instead to ask whether there are social phenomena that could be better
described by, say, vectors on a Hilbert space and Hermitian operators representing
observable quantities.
In many cases the quantum-like probabilistic structure is modelled by introducing
the use of “quantum” intermediate states, often not accessible under certain experimental
conditions, whose superposition are similar to the superposition of the two quantum
waves, ψA and ψB, in analogy to the two-slit experiment. This is, for instance, how
the violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle (STP) is modelled with state vectors [4].
Thus, it should come as no surprise that one of the often used analogies is interference in
the two-slit experiment, since it is perhaps best illustrates some of the puzzling quantum
aspects [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7].
The importance of the two slit in physics is emphasized by Richard Feynman in
his celebrated lectures on physics [8]. There, Feynman states that the only mystery
in quantum mechanics is contained in this experiment, and that it “is impossible,
absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way” this phenomenon. Though grossly
inaccurate‡, Feynman’s claim carries a certain element of truth, as the outcomes of the
two slit experiment seem to make no sense if we think solely in terms of particles and
detectors. At the heart of such mystery is connection between the particle’s trajectory
and its surroundings (the context), yielding probabilistic outcomes that are not only
context-dependent but also non-monotonic.
The above “mystery” raises the prospect of thinking of quantum-like effects in the
social sciences as originated by the interference effects of highly contextual variables
[10, 11]. For instance, in the case of human decision making, one can show that, under
reasonable assumptions, neural oscillators in the brain may lead to interference-like
effects that are similar to a two-slit set-up [12, 13, 14]. This interference is highly
contextual, as it depends on boundary conditions on the dynamics of neural oscillators,
and can not be described by standard probability theory. Furthermore, such contextual
variables may have a description in terms of extended probabilities that is more general
than the standard quantum formalism [15, 16, 17].
Part of the mystery is related to the use of counter-factual reasoning [18, 19].
Counter-factual reasoning in quantum mechanics is based on non-measured properties
of a system. Suppose that we have two observations A = 1 and B = 1, with A
‡ For example, as Feynman was well aware, David Bohm provided a way to think about the two slit
in terms of classical concepts of waves and particles [9].
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preceding (perhaps even causally) B. In this case, a counter-factual reasoning would be
something like “if A = 1 had not been observed, B = 1 would not have been observed.”
It is often pointed out that the inconsistencies associated with quantum mechanics come
from the use of counter-factual reasoning. For example, in the famous GHZ paradox
[20], inconsistencies are derived from the assumption that values of some observables
are defined even if experimental conditions when they had not been observed, which
is equivalent to requiring the existence of a non-negative joint probability distribution
[21].
The use of negative probabilities connected to the quantum formalism dates back
from the seminal works of Eugene Wigner [22], where he showed that if one wanted a
joint probability distribution of momentum and position that would reproduce quantum
statistical mechanics predictions, such joint would have to take negative values. Later
on, Paul Dirac [23] proposed the use of negative probabilities to understand the
quantization of electromagnetic fields. However, as Richard Feynman remarked, even
though negative probabilities seem to be a part of quantum mechanics, no practical
use was ever found for them [24], although recently some authors proposed possible
applications [17, 25, 26].
Perhaps one of the difficulties of using negative probabilities is its unclear physical
meaning. Wigner considered them nonsensical, and both Dirac and Feynman thought
they were mere computational devices devoid of meaning. However, recently many
different interpretations have appeared. For example, in [16] a possible subjective
interpretation in terms of non-monotonic upper probability distributions was proposed,
and in [25] a map based on positive and negative measures gave a possible frequentist
interpretation to negative probabilities. Another approach was that of Khrennikov, who
showed that negative probabilities are obtained in the context of p-adic statistics, and are
the consequence of a violation of principle of statistical stabilization [27, 28, 29, 30, 31].
Be that as it may, negative probabilities in quantum mechanics seem to be related to the
appearance of correlations that are too strong to be explained by a context-independent
hidden-variable theory [32], such as the case for the well-known Bell-EPR systems.
Our goal in this paper is to examine the use of extended probabilities in the
context of the two-slit experiment, as suitable for discussions in quantum cognition.
In particular, we examine this experiment in its simplified version: the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. We then discuss what constraints are imposed to a rational description
of the system when further (counter-factual) information is assumed about the system.
To do so, we organize this paper in the following way. In Section 2 we discuss a typical
application of the quantum formalism in decision making, showing its equivalence to the
quantum Mach-Zehnder interferometer. In Section 3 we analyse in terms of negative
probabilities the Mach-Zehnder set-up, and show that certain types of counter-factual
reasoning are inconsistent with them.
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2. Interference in Quantum Cognition
Let us start with the famous violation of STP, observed empirically by Tversky and Shafir
[33, 34]. In one of their experiments, participants (students in a college-level class) were
asked whether they would buy a certain ticket under three different contexts. In the
first context, they were asked if they would buy if the passed the class. In the second
context, they were asked if they would buy if they failed the class. Finally, in the third
context they were asked whether they would buy the ticket if they didn’t know whether
they passed the class or not. Participants consistently preferred to buy the tickets when
they knew whether they passed or failed the class than if they didn’t know, a violation
of STP.
To understand this violation of STP, it helps to write the situation in a more formal
way. Let P and B be two ±1-valued random variables. B represents the intent to buy
a ticket, and P represents passing the class, with both taking value 1 if the answer
was “yes” and −1 if “no”. The probability of purchasing a ticket in the first context
corresponds to the value P (b|p), the second context to P (b|p). Since in the third
context the participant does not know, but 1 and −1 are the only possible outcomes,
the third context must be P (b|p ∪ p) = P (b). Here we use the standard notation that
b represents B = 1, b represents B = −1, and so on. Since the probability of B = 1 is
given by
P (b|p ∪ p) = P (b) = P (b|p)P (p) + P (b|p)P (p) , (1)
with P (p)+P (p) = 1, it follows that P (b|p ∪ p) is a convex combination of P (b|p) and
P (b|p). Thus, P (b|p ∪ p) ≥ P (b|p). This, of course, contradicts the results of Tversky
and Shafir, and shows that their participants violate STP, a consequence of the standard
theory of probabilities.
It is worthwhile mentioning here that the main characteristic of the data, as the one
discussed above, is to show that, under certain circumstances, human decision making
is non-monotonic. Recall that standard probability theory is monotonic, in the sense
that for two sets A and B with B ⊆ A, P (A) ≥ P (B). Monotonicity is a consequence
of the additivity rule, which gives P (A) = P
(
B ∪B) = P (B)+P (B), with B = A\B
being the relative complement of B in A, plus the non-negativity axiom. This means
that certain extended probability theories that are monotonic, such as Dempster-Shafer
[35, 36], may not be adequate to describe actual human decision making.
Non-monotonicity is directly connected to the quantum formalism via quantum
interference. To understand this, let us examine the Mach-Zehnder interferometer,
depicted in Figure 1, as a simplified two-slit experiment. The input into the system
is the state |1〉S|0〉V , corresponding to one photon in channel S and no photon in the
vacuum channel V . After the first beam splitter the state becomes
1√
2
[|1〉A|0〉B + |0〉A|1〉B] ,
where the subscripts A and B are the modes in the arms of the interferometer, and the
state corresponds to a superposition of a photon in A or B. Ignoring the reflection on
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Figure 1. Mach-Zehnder interferometer. A single particle emitted from source S
reaches beam-splitter BS1, and has a 50/50 probability of going to either arm, A or
B, of the interferometer. A second beam-splitter BS2 then joints both paths A and B
and sends them to detectors D1 and D2. The intensities seem on D1 and D2 depend
on the relative phases of each beam, determined by the phase shifter δ.
the mirrors, since what is relevant is the phase introduced by δ, the state impinging
upon the second beam splitter is
1√
2
[
eiδ|1〉A|0〉B + |0〉A|1〉B
]
.
Finally, the state impinging upon the detectors is given by
1
2
(
1− eiδ) |1〉1|0〉2 + 1
2
(
1 + eiδ
) |0〉1|1〉2,
where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to detectors D1 and D2 respectively. As we can see, the
probability of detections are P (d1) = 12 (1− cos δ) and P (d2) = 12 (1 + cos δ), and if we
select δ = pi, the probability of detection on D1 is one whereas on D2 it is zero. However,
if we measure the particle in one of the interferometer arms, say after the phase δ is
introduced, we end up with a mixture of two possible states, |1〉a|0〉b or |0〉a|1〉b. After
the last beam splitter, we get the state
1√
2
[|1〉1|0〉2 + |0〉1|1〉2] ,
and we see that the probabilities for detection are now P (d1) = P (d2) = 12 .
From the above computations we can now see the non-monotonicity of this set-up.
Let us imagine two possibilities. Possibility one is such that the photon can only travel
through path A, perhaps by simply placing a barrier on path B. Possibility two is
when no barriers are placed, and the photon can freely travel through either arm of
the interferometer. According to monotonic reasoning, the more possibilities we have
going from S to D2, the higher the probability of D2. However, if we choose δ = pi,
P (d2) = 0 for both paths being available, and P (d2) = 12 for only one path available. In
other words, P (d2|a ∪ b) ≤ P (d2|a), similar to the violation of Savage’s STP mentioned
above.
To model the violation of Savage’s STP with a quantum formalism, all we need to
do is to think of the path information |1〉a or |1〉b as the “pass” or “fail” class intermediate
states, say |pass〉 and |fail〉. The final detectors D1 and D2 corresponding to “buy” or
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“not buy” the ticket. So, in one experimental condition, when the experimenter asks
the answer if the participant passed the class, this would correspond to measuring a
which path the particle travelled, thus collapsing the wave function in the |pass〉 state
and destroying the interference. In other words, in the version of the experiment where
participants are asked their answers if the passed or failed, their state evolves as
|pass〉 or |fail〉 −→ 1√
2
[|purchase〉+ |not purchase〉] ,
whereas in the other version the evolution is
1√
2
[|pass〉+ |fail〉] −→ 1
2
[(
1− eiδ) |purchase〉+ (1 + eiδ) |not purchase〉] ,
where δ is a phase parameter responsible for interference.
3. Counter-factuals and Signed Probabilities
The violation of Kolmogorov’s axioms can be shown to correspond, in the case of
quantum systems, to the existence of a signed probability distribution [26, 17, 25],
where the non-negativity axiom is relaxed. As mentioned in the introduction, negative
probabilities are the consequence of correlations between different random variables
that cannot be explained by a context-independent hidden variable [32]. Though the
correlations themselves are observable in physical systems, negative probability states
are not observable in principle [17], whereas this may not necessarily be true for social
systems where negative probabilities appear [16, 37]. In this section we show how
negative probabilities can be used in the Mach-Zehnder case shown above, and what are
the possible insights that we may gain from it.
Let us imagine that we perform a destructive measurement. The constraints given
by the marginals are
P (ab) = P (ab) =
1
2
, (2)
and
P (ab) = P (ab) = 0, (3)
which corresponds to having only one photon at a time. Here we use the notation a
as corresponding a detection in the interferometer arm A, and a for no detection, and
similarly for b, d1, and d2. A different experiment, when no detection is made for A or
B, thus yielding interference at the detectors, requires
P (d1d2) = 1− α, (4)
P (d1d2) = α, (5)
P (d1d2) = P (d1d2) = 0, (6)
where α = 0 or α = 1 give maximum interferometric visibility. A non-negative
probability distributions exists for (2)–(6) if we assume that (2) and (3) still holds
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when we have interference. For example, a possible (non-unique) solution consistent
with the marginals is given by
P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
=
1
2
(1− α) ,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
=
1
2
α,
and the other atomic elements of the algebra (e.g., abd1d2, abd1d2, etc.) having
probability zero.
But we also know, from another experimental set-up where we place a detector in
only one of the interferometer arms, that when the particle is not in A and no detector
in B, there is a probability of detection in D1 and D2 given by
P (ad1d2) = P (ad1d2) = P (bd1d2) = P (bd1d2) =
1
4
, (7)
which implies the destruction of interference by which-path information. Contrary to the
marginals (2)–(6), there is no non-negative joint probability distribution consistent with
(4)–(7). However, if we relax the requirement that probabilities must be non-negative,
it is possible to show that there is an infinite number of (negative) joint probability
distributions that are consistent with (4)–(7).
Once the non-negativity requirement is relaxed, solutions consistent with marginals
can start to have very large (negative and positive) values. To further constraint the
negative probability solutions, we add the principle that the probability massM , defined
asM =
∑ |pi| (pi being the probability for each atom), should be minimized. Intuitively
minimizing the L1 norm of the probability P corresponds to requiring that P be as close
as possible to a non-negative probability distribution [16], and prevents solutions with
large negative or positive values.
The general solution consistent with (4)–(7) and minimizing the probability mass
M is, for the non-zero probability terms,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= −3
4
+ x+ α, P
(
abd1d2
)
= 3
4
− x− α,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
2
− x, P (abd1d2) = x,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
2
− x, P (abd1d2) = x,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= −1
4
+ x, P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
4
− x.
(8)
M is minimized in (8) when 1/4 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/4, 1/4 ≤ x ≤ 3/4 − α for
1/4 ≤ α ≤ 1/2, 3/4 − α ≤ x ≤ 1/4 for 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 3/4, and 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1/4 for 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Notice that if α = 1/2, for no interference, the joint becomes
P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
= 0,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
=
P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
= P
(
abd1d2
)
=
1
4
,
which is non-negative, as expected. However, for α 6= 1/2, which is the case for
interference, no non-negative solutions exist. For example, in the case of maximum
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visibility, when α = 1, a possible negative joint probability minimizing the probability
mass M is given by (choosing x = 1/4)
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
2
, P
(
abd1d2
)
= −1
2
,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
4
, P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
4
,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
4
, P
(
abd1d2
)
= 1
4
,
P
(
abd1d2
)
= 0, P
(
abd1d2
)
= 0.
On the other hand, if we use counter-factual reasoning for the above probabilities,
we have that if there is no detection in A, then we must have B = 1, whereas no
detection in B means A = 1. Thus, the probabilities are
P (abd1d2) = P (abd1d2) = P (abd1d2) = P (abd1d2) =
1
4
, (9)
and all other probabilities are zero. It is easy to show that no negative probabilities
exist consistent with (4)–(6) and (9).
4. Final Remarks
We saw that in the two slit experiment, in the simpler context of the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer, proper probability distributions exist if we do not make any assumptions
about which-path information. However, once we include which-path information in the
form of counter-factual reasoning, no proper joint exists, and negative probabilities are
needed. Furthermore, if we assume more about the trajectory of the particle than what
is contained in (7), i.e. if we include more counter-factual assumptions as in (9), not
even a negative probability distribution exists.
The non-existence of a negative probability, as showed in [17], is related to the
violation of the no-signalling condition, which in psychology is equivalent to the violation
of marginal selectivity [38, 39]. This should not come as a surprise, because a Mach-
Zehnder can be used to signal. To see this, imagine that Alice is at the arms of the
interferometer, and Bob is looking at the detectors D1 and D2. Alice’s decision to
measure or not where the particle is would affect the outcomes of Bob in a way that
Bob could tell whether Alice is measuring or not. Of course, this type of signalling does
not present any conceptual problems, as it is purely classical, since it would take some
time for the particle to arrive from Alice and Bob, and their measurements would not
be space-like separated.
Our results suggest that in quantum-like decision-making, where most effects come
from cases where the superposition of two states result in quantum-like interference, we
should expect violation of marginal selectivity (or the no-signalling condition in physics).
Furthermore, if we want to use the empirical results to think about inaccessible internal
reasoning states (e.g., if the student answered “buy a ticket”, was she thinking “passed
class”?), since those states are not directly measured, we need to use counter-factual
reasoning. However, as we showed above, not every counter-factual reasoning allows us
to obtain information about the system, as a (negative) joint probability cannot always
be found (such as in equations (9)). Thus, to think about those internal reasoning
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states, one needs to restrict the counter-factual assumptions one makes or perhaps use
a more general approach, such as the one proposed by Dzhafarov and Kujala [38].
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